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GOD AND DISPOSITIONAL 
ESSENTIALISM: 
AN ACCOUNT OF THE 
LAWS OF NATURE 
 
 
BY 
 
DANI ADAMS 
______________________________________________________ 
 
Abstract: It is common to appeal to governing laws of nature in order to explain the existence of 
natural regularities. Classical theism, however, maintains the sovereignty thesis: everything distinct 
from God is created by him and is under his guidance and control. It follows from this that God 
must somehow be responsible for natural laws and regularities. Therefore, theists need an account 
of the relation between (i) regularities, (ii) laws, and (iii) God. I examine competing accounts of 
laws of nature and conclude that dispositional essentialism provides the most satisfactory explanation 
of the relation between (i), (ii) and (iii).  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
There are many patterns of regularity in the way that entities behave in the world. Examples of 
such natural regularities include the fact that heat always transfers from a hotter to a cooler body, 
and that the pressure of a gas tends to decrease as the volume of a gas increases.1 Commonly, it 
LV WKRXJKW WKDW VXFK SDWWHUQV RI UHJXODULW\ FRXOGQ·W KDYH DULVHQ DV D PDWWHU RI SXUH FKDQFH
Therefore, the thought goes, the existence of such regularities requires a deeper explanation.2 For 
example, Galen Strawson states: 
 
7KHREMHFWLRQ«QHHGQ·WEHPHUHO\QHJDWLYH,WQHHGQ·WEHMXVWWKDWLWLVDEVXUGJLYHQDUHJXODUZRUOG
to insist that there is definitely nothing about the nature of the world given which it is regular rather than 
chaotic. It may also be positive: it may also be that (2) it is reasonable (in some perhaps irreducibly vague 
but profoundly unshakeable sense), given a regular world, to suppose, positively, that there definitely is 
something about the nature of the world given which it is regular, something which is therefore not itself 
just the fact of its regularity. (1989: 24) 
 
Most commonly, natural regularities (regularities hereafter) are explained by appeal to certain laws 
of nature (hereafter, simply laws).3 As David Armstrong explains: 
 
Suppose that a number of Fs have all been observed, and that each is a G. No F that is not a G has been 
observed. We might ask for an explanation of this fact. One possible explanation is that it is a law that Fs 
are Gs. If such a law really holds, then the explanation will be quite a good one. 
Suppose, however, that laws are mere regularities. We are then trying to explain the fact that all 
observed Fs are Gs by appealing to the hypothesis that all Fs are Gs. Could this hypothesis serve as an 
explanation? It does not seem that it could. (1983: 40) 
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These laws are said to govern the behaviour of objects; thereby ensuring that nature unfolds in a 
regular manner.4, 5 So, in the first example given above, there will be a law which prescribes that 
heat always transfers from a hotter to a cooler body. 
Classical theism, however, maintains an additional principle regarding natural explanation: 
the sovereignty thesis. The sovereignty thesis maintains that God is the creator of Heaven and Earth, 
and that all that exists is under God's sovereign guidance and possible control. In a similar vein, 
Brian Leftow explains the idea that all causal explanations eventually trace back to (and ultimately 
VWRSDW*RG¶WKHUHLVQRGLJJLQJGHHSHUthan God; God and nothing else constitutes the basic 
FDXVDOFRQWH[WIRUWKHUHVWRIUHDOLW\· ,WIROORZVIURPWKHVRYHUHLJQW\WKHVLV WKDW*RG
must somehow be responsible for any regularities and laws of nature existing in our universe. 
Therefore, theists need an account of the relation between (i) regularities, (ii) laws of nature, and 
(iii) God. This paper critically examines one such account, given by John Foster in his book The 
Divine Lawmaker. ,W VKRZV WKDW ZKLOH )RVWHU·V DFFRXQW IDFHV LQVXUPRuntable challenges, these 
challenges can helpfully point us towards an account that proves to be more successful.6 
Foster holds a metaphysically robust, anti-singularist account of laws which views laws as 
governing from the top down.7 ,W·VWKHVHDVSHFWVRf his account which are problematic, for, as we 
will see in §4, they stand in tension with the divine sovereignty thesis and the further theistic 
GRFWULQH RI GLYLQH DVHLW\ ,W IROORZV WKHUHIRUH WKDW WKH EHVW DFFRXQW RI *RG·V UHODWLRQ WR
regularities and laws of nature will take a singularist and bottom-up view of natural laws. §5 
presents a theistic version of dispositional essentialism which fits this model and §6 discusses some 
potential lines of objection to the proposed account and shows that each of these can be met. 
Before concluding in §9, §7 and §8 each argue respectively why the alternative universals and 
regularities accounts of laws are theistically unacceptable and therefore no competitors to theistic 
dispositional essentialism. 
 
 
2. Laws of Nature 
 
Amongst the accounts which invoke laws in order to explain regularities, there is much 
disagreement over what the correct account of laws is. Such accounts differ over three main 
issues: (i) with respect to the ontological status of laws, (ii) with respect to the modal status of 
laws, and (iii) with regards to whether they admit singular causation. The following section 
outlines these areas of dispute. The remainder of the paper considers which account of laws best 
explains regularities in accordance with the commitments of classical theism. 
 
 
2.1 Top-down vs. bottom-up laws 
 
Any account of laws will have to take a stance on the ontological status of laws. In particular, it 
will have to take a stance on whether the truths relating to laws are supervenient on regularities 
(and therefore on the properties of objects and events they govern), or whether the truths 
expressed by statements of regularities are supervenient on those expressed by statements of 
laws. Any view which takes the former approach, I describe as positing laws which arise ² and 
thereby govern ² IURPWKH¶ERWWRP-XS·WKHODWWHU,WDNHWRJRYHUQIURPWKH¶WRS-GRZQ· 
Top-down views clearly have a more metaphysically robust view of natural laws, in that 
they take them to be in some sense prior to the regularities they govern. Top-down laws strongly 
JRYHUQLQWKHVHQVHWKDWWKH\¶DUHVRPHKRZLPSRVHGRQWKLQJVZKRVHLGHQWLWLHVDUHLQGHSHQGHQW
RIWKHODZV·(OOLV,QRWKHUZRUGVWRKROGDWRS-down view of laws is to view nature 
as essentially passive, and therefore as requiring governance from natural laws in order that 
objects and events enter into causal relations. According to top-down accounts, laws cannot be 
reduced to any non-nomic ontological category.8 As such, top-down views may be contrasted 
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with accounts such as the regularity view, which take laws to be mere generalisations of natural 
regularities.  
There is a variety of positions proponents of top-down views may take with regard to 
which ontological category they identify laws with. One option is to take laws as ontologically 
SULPLWLYHDYLHZWDNHQE\7LP0DXGOLQZKRVWDWHVWKDW¶ODZVRIQDWXUHVWDQGLQQRQHHG
RI ¶SKLORVRSKLFDO DQDO\VLV· WKH\ RXJKW WR EH SRVLWHG DV RQWRORJLFDO EHGURFN· ibid: 1) Another 
option is to take laws to be abstract entities akin to numbers, sets, and propositions. Foster (2004) 
GHIHQGVDWKHLVWLFYHUVLRQRIVXFKDQDFFRXQW8QGHUKLVYLHZODZVDUH¶DEVWUDFWHQWLWLHVZKRVH
H[LVWHQFHFRQVLVWVLQWKHUHOHYDQWIDFWVRIQRPLFQHFHVVLW\·ibid: 156) A third type of top-down 
view identifies laws with states of affairs which involve a second-order universal, N, relating two 
first-order universals. This view is perhaps most famously advocated by David Armstrong 
(1985).9 For Armstrong, these second-order universals are relations of nomic necessity which hold 
between the first-RUGHU SURSHUWLHV RI REMHFWV 8QGHU $UPVWURQJ·V universals account, laws are 
necessitation relations which hold between property types, as opposed to tokens. Therefore, 
objects will be governed by the relations the universals they instantiate enter into.  
Bottom-up views, by contrast, are less metaphysically robust since they take laws to be 
ontologically dependent upon the regularities they govern. One example of a bottom-up view is 
dispositional essentialism, the view that (at least some of) the fundamental properties of objects 
are essentially dispositional. Dispositional properties are usually characterised as those which 
confer causal powers or capacities on the objects which instantiate them. Typically, they support 
counterfactual statements involving their bearers. For example, un-boiled eggs have the 
GLVSRVLWLRQ¶IUDJLOLW\·ZKLFKFRQIHUVWKHWHQGHQF\WREUHDNXQGHUFHUWDLQVWLPXOXVFRQGLWLRQVVXFK
as being dropped. Therefore, WKHGLVSRVLWLRQVXSSRUWVWKHWUXWKRI WKHFRXQWHUIDFWXDO WKDW ¶LI LW
ZHUH WKH FDVH WKDW WKHHJJZDVGURSSHG WKHQ LWZRXOGEH WKH FDVH WKDW WKH HJJZRXOGEUHDN·
Dispositional properties are often contrasted with categorical ones. Categorical properties 
t\SLFDOO\DUHQRWWDNHQWRVXSSRUWFRXQWHUIDFWXDOVVLQFHWKH\GRQRW¶ORRNEH\RQG·WKHLUEHDUHUV
Examples of such properties include the microstructure and shape of an object.10 According to 
this view (held for example, by Brian Ellis (2000, 2001) and Alexander Bird (2007)), laws are 
identified with universal descriptions of the essentially dispositional properties of objects. Ellis 
explains his own version of this view as follows:  
 
It is a bottom-up sort of theory, rather than top-down, and it depends on taking a realist, non-reductionist, 
view of the causal powers, capacities and propensities of the most fundamental things in nature, and 
assuming them to be ultimately responsible for determining how these things are intrinsically disposed to 
behave. So, according to scientific essentialism, the causal laws are ontologically dependent on the 
dispositional properties of things. They are not laws which are imposed on things which are essentially 
passive, and are thus bound to do as the laws command. (2000: 330) 
 
Dispositional essentialism, then, views nature as essentially powerful ² laws do not 
LPSRVHWKHPVHOYHVRQWKHZRUOGWRSURGXFHFDXVDOUHODWLRQVIRULW·VWKHdispositions of objects which 
FRQIHUFDXVDOSRZHUV$V*HRUJH0ROQDUH[SODLQV¶«ZKDWSRZHUVWKere are does not depend on 
what laws there are, but vice versa, what laws obtain in a world is a function of what powers are 
WR EH IRXQG LQ WKDW ZRUOG·   ,W LV IRU WKLV UHDVRQ WKDW GLVSRVLWLRQDO HVVHQWLDOLVP LV D
bottom-up view.  
Another type of bottom-up view is the regularity theory. According this view, laws are 
nothing over and above natural regularities. In its most basic form, the regularity theory 
maintains that laws are simply universal generalisations of regularities. According to the more 
sophisticated version, the systems approach developed by David Lewis (1973), laws are those 
regularities which belong to all the true deductive systems with a best combination of simplicity 
and strength. As such, the regularity theory views regularities as ontologically prior to laws: if 
there were no regularities in nature, there would be no laws. So, laws do not give rise to 
regularities;11 rather, the laws supervene on the regularities.   
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2.2 The modal status of laws 
 
There is also dispute over the modal properties of laws.12 For instance, while our best physical 
WKHRULHV WDNH LW DV D ODZ WKDWQRWKLQJZLWKDPDVVFDQEHDFFHOHUDWHG WR WKH VSHHGRI OLJKW LW·V
much less clear what kind of modal status this law should have. There are three options available 
here. Laws might be taken to be (i) logically necessary; (ii) metaphysically necessary; or (iii) 
metaphysically contingent.  
One would be hard pressed to find a philosopher who has defended the first view. 
Presumably the view is out of favour because it simply just does not seem inconceivable that the 
laws of nature could have been different in the way that it seems inconceivable that the sum of 2 
+ 2 could not have equalled 4. 
I take metaphysical necessities to be broadly logical; i.e., I take them to be strictly 
necessary truths whose denials are not contra-logical. Metaphysical necessities are grounded by 
WKHQDWXUHVRIREMHFWVDQGH[SUHVVLEOHLQWHUPVRILGHQWLW\VWDWHPHQWVVXFKDV¶QHFHVVDULO\ZDWHULV
H22·7\SLFDOO\GLVSRVLWLRQDOHVVHQWLDOLVWVWDNH the view that laws hold of metaphysical necessity 
for the following reason: since the laws are supervenient upon the dispositions objects possess 
essentially, the same laws must hold in any world where the same dispositional properties are 
instantiated. (I am assuming here that if an object, x, is essentially F, then it will also be the case 
that x is necessarily F.13) The laws supervene on the essential properties of objects in the sense 
that no two worlds can differ in terms of their laws without their being a different with respect 
to which properties are instantiated in them. I also take it that this supervenience relation holds 
of necessity. Hence, it is true at every world that the laws of nature supervene on the essential 
dispositional properties of objects. As Bird explains: 
 
If properties have a dispositional essence then certain relations will hold of necessity between the relevant 
XQLYHUVDOV WKHVH UHODWLRQVZHPD\ LGHQWLI\ZLWK WKH ODZVRI QDWXUH7KHQHFHVVLW\KHUH LVPHWDSK\VLFDO«
Since the relevant relations hold necessarily, this view is committed to necessitarianism about laws³laws 
DUHPHWDSK\VLFDOO\QHFHVVDU\« 
 
However, it is possible for a dispositional essentialist to take either a weak or a strong 
position with respect to the mHWDSK\VLFDOQHFHVVLW\RIODZV$FFRUGLQJWRWKHZHDNSRVLWLRQ¶WKH
necessity of laws is a restricted metaphysical necessity³a law holds in all possible worlds where 
the relevant universal exists·14 (Ibid.) According to the stronger position, the laws and the properties 
exist in all worlds without exception. In what follows, I assume only the weaker version: the laws 
conditionalised on the existence of the properties mentioned in them are metaphysically necessary. 
$FFRUGLQJ WR $UPVWURQJ·V XQLYHUVDOV DSSURDFh, laws are contingent, since the second-
order universals involved in relations of nomic necessitation are merely contingently associated 
with the first-order universals of the objects which instantiate them. This means that whichever 
laws hold in the actual world will be restricted to the actual world. However, under the universals 
approach, the laws do confer necessary connections between the objects they govern. Those who 
hold a regularity view also maintain that laws hold contingently. For, given that the laws 
supervene on the regularities, if the regularities had been different, so too would the laws. And, 
JLYHQ WKDW WKH ODZVGRQ·W govern WKH UHJXODULWLHV WKHUH LVQR UHDVRQ WR WKLQN WKDW WKHUH FRXOGQ·W
have been different regularities.  
 
 
2.3 Singularism 
 
A third area of disagreement concerns whether to admit singular causation. Call those theories 
ZKLFKGR¶VLQJXODULVW·DQGWKRVHZKLFKGRQ·W¶DQWL-VLQJXODULVW·$WKHRU\DGPLWVVLQJXODUFDXVDWLRQ
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if it allows that two or more causal relata ² say, events c and e ² have, in themselves, some property 
(or properties) in virtue of which we can say that one caused the other without knowing whether, 
and without its being the case that, C-type events are always followed by E-type events. One 
defender of singularism is C. J. Ducasse, who elucidates the concept as follows: 
 
«UHFXUUHQFHEHFRPHV UHODWHGDW DOO WRFDXVDWLRQRQO\ZKHQD ODZ LV FRQVLGHUHGZKLFKKDSSHQV WREHD
generalisation of facts themselves individually causal to begin with. A general proposition concerning such 
facts is, indeed, a causal law, but it is not causal because it is general. It is general, i.e. a law, only because it 
is about a class of resembling facts; and it is causal only because each of them already happens to be a causal fact 
individually and in its own right (instead of, as Hume would have it, by right of its co-membership with others 
in a class of pairs of successive events). The causal relation is essentially a relation between concrete individual 
HYHQWV«(1926: 61).15  
 
Dispositional essentialism is one view which allows for singular causation. This is because, 
according to this account, the laws are ontologically dependent upon the causal relata ² taken as 
individuals ² themselves. Therefore, in order to know whether particular objects c and e are 
causally related, all we need do is look to their respective dispositional properties; we need not 
look beyond these tokens to their respective types C and E. Ellis (2000: 329), for example, states 
that under dispositional essentialism, WKH FDXVDO ODZV ¶FRQFHUQHG ZLWK QHFHVVDU\ FRQQHFWLRQV
between events or circumstances of precisely the sort required for a decent account of singular 
FDXVDWLRQ·+RZHYHULWGRHVQRWIROORZIURPWKLVVLQJXODULVWYLHZWKDWIRUH[DPSOHWKHODZWKDW
H2O freezes at 0
ɿC does not apply to non-actual samples of water, or worlds in which there is no 
water.  As Bird explains, where L(P) is a law concerning some property, P, then:  
 
Just as worlds where Eric Blair was never born are not counterexamples to the claim ɷ(ULFBlair = George 
Orwell), worlds where P does not exist are not counterexamples to the claim ɷ/3«:KDWɷ/3UXOHV
out are worlds where P exists but is not governed E\WKHODZ/3« 
 
The Humean regularity theory, by contrast, is anti-singularist because causal relations are 
taken to be logically supervenient on the laws. What it is for a particular causal relation to hold 
e.g. for event c to cause event e, according to the regularity theorist, is just for it to be the case 
that (i) c is temporally prior to e; that (ii) c and e are spatiotemporally contiguous; and that (iii) 
each event of kind C is followed by an event of kind E.16 Further, the regularity that all Fs are 
followed by Gs constitutes a law, according to this view. It follows therefore that the regularity 
theorist must be anti-singularist since condition (iii) on causal relations implies that each causal 
relation must be lawful.  
The universals account takes laws to be relations between second-order universals. So, 
for example, LI LW·V D ODZ WKDW׊x [Fx ȺGx], then this will be explained by the holding of the 
necessitation relation N between the two universals F and G: N [F, G]. Importantly, the first-
order universals (F and G) here are types. It follows, therefore, that on this account causal 
relations are supervenient on the nomic necessitation relations. Since the laws strongly govern 
the objects and events which instantiate these universals (i.e. they govern top-down), we do, 
therefore, need to look beyond the tokens c and e to their types C and E.  
With these distinctions in place, we can now consider what kind of theory of laws best 
DFFRXQWV IRU *RG·V UHODWLRQ WR ODZV DQG UHJXODULWLHV ,V WKHUH DQ\ UHDVRQ WR WKLQN WKDW WKHLVWV
cannot admit anti-singularism? Does either the metaphysical necessity or contingency of laws fit 
better with a causal story involving God? These metaphysical issues have received scant explicit 
discussion. However, one author who has paid this matter some attention is Foster. It will be 
useful, then, to examine his account in the next section. The issues that will be shown to arise 
ZLWK)RVWHU·VDFFRXQWZLOOSURYLGHDXVHIXOSODWIRUPIURPZKLFKWREXLOGDEHWWHUYLHZ 
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3. )RVWHU·V3URSRVDO 
 
$VQRWHGDERYH)RVWHU·VDFFRXQWRIODZVLVRIWKHPHWDSK\VLFDOO\UREXVWtop-down variety. It also 
takes the laws of nature to hold contingently. In order to understand why Foster proposes such a 
YLHZ LWZLOO ILUVWEHXVHIXO WRRXWOLQH WKHDVVXPSWLRQV)RVWHUEDVHV LW DURXQG)RVWHU·V VWDUWLQJ
assumptions, both theistic and metaphysical, may be stated as follows: 
 
Divine Libertarian Freedom: God is an omnipotent, independent, perfect being so must 
enjoy libertarian freedom. 
The Contingency of the Actual World, @: *LYHQGLYLQH OLEHUWDULDQ IUHHGRP*RG·VFKRLFH WR
create @ was a free decision, so he could have chosen to actualise a different 
possible world. Therefore @ exists contingently. 
Theoretical Elegance: other things being equal, we ought to accept the account of causation 
and laws which avoids the most unnecessary complexity, and which minimises 
residual sources of puzzlement.  
The Metaphysical Contingency of (Natural) Laws: laws are metaphysically contingent but 
nonetheless confer physically necessary connections between causal relata.  
The Causal Source of (Natural) Regularities: Since LW·VPHUHO\QRPLFDOO\QHFHVVDU\ WKDW WKLQJV
are regular in the way they are in @, there must be something that causally imposes 
this regularity on the universe qua regularity. 
 
Divine libertarian freedom is a thesis which has a strong pedigree within the classical 
theistic tradition. For example, St Thomas Aquinas (1975: Ch. 88) maintains that freedom is a 
perfection, and given that God is the most perfect being, he must possess freedom to the highest 
degree; his actions must not be limited by any causal state of affairs. The thesis is also supported 
by a number of prominent contemporary philosophers of religion such as Thomas V. Morris 
(1987) and Richard Swinburne (1977). Given its pedigree, I am willing to grant Foster this thesis.  
The metaphysical contingency of @, as noted above, appears to follow from divine 
OLEHUWDULDQ IUHHGRP $V .ODDV - .UDD\ QRWHV ¶7KHLVWV JHQHUDOO\ DVVHUW WKDW *RG·V GHFLVLRQ WR
create is a free one. In the contemporary literature, this thought is extended to the claim that 
*RG·VVHOHFWLRQRIDSRVVLEOHZRUOGWRDFWXDOLVHLVIUHH·)RUWKHVDNHRIDUJXPHQW,·OO
set aside any worries that, if @ is the best possible world, then God had no choice but to create 
@.  
Theoretical elegance seems to be simply a conjunction of OFNKDP·VUD]RUDQGWKH LGHD
that a theory ought to explain as much as possible. I take it that these are commonly enough held 
desiderata for any philosophical theory. For these reasons, I will join Foster in accepting divine 
libertarian freedom, the contingency of @, and theoretical elegance. By contrast, the contingency 
of laws and the causal source of regularities are far more controversial proposals since they each 
favour particular theses concerning laws.  
Foster maintains that the contingency of natural laws ought to be read in the sense of 
mere nomological³rather than metaphysical³QHFHVVLW\+HVWDWHV¶IRUDQ\ODZZHVXUHO\KDYH
WRDFNQRZOHGJHWKDWWKHUHDUHSRVVLEOHZRUOGVLQZKLFKWKDWODZGRHVQRWREWDLQ·7KH
idea is that we can envisage possible worlds which contain the same properties as those in @, but in 
which the laws of nature differ from those in @. 
This claim is, however, questionable. Granted, it does seem conceivable that one can 
envisage possible worlds in which the properties of objects which exist in @ conform to 
alternative laws. However, Foster is too quick to conclude that this demonstrates that the laws 
are merely nomically necessary. For, there is an alternative explanation for the imagined scenario. 
The dispositional essentialist, for example, will maintain that what one is conceiving in these 
kinds of scenario is a very similar, but importantly different kind of property, which behaves 
GLIIHUHQWO\7DNHIRUH[DPSOHWKHFDVHRI+LODU\3XWQDP·VWZLQ-earth scenario in which 
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the water-like substance, XYZ, exists on a different planet. XYZ may appear to be water, but it is 
QRWEHFDXVH LW·VQRWFRPSRVHGRI+2O).) The dispositional essentialist will maintain that since 
the imagined property has different causal powers,17 it cannot be the same property. Rather, one 
is conceiving of a similar such property ² one with different causal powers ² and this simply 
gives rise to the mistaken belief that the properties instantiated in @ could have been governed 
by alternative laws of nature. Foster is not, therefore, entitled to the conclusion that laws are 
metaphysically contingent. To reach that conclusion, Foster needs the further argument that it is 
indeed the very same property we are envisaging ² and, moreover, an argument to justify the 
move from conceivability to possibility, but no such argument is forthcoming. 
Foster maintains that there must be a causal source of regularities, one which causes the 
regularities to hold qua regularities. By this he means that the regulariWLHV FDQ·W KROG E\ PHUH
accident. For, he urges, there must be an explanation for why these regularities hold as opposed to 
some others. The only plausible explanation, says Foster, is that the existence of the relevant 
regularities is to be explained in terms of the deeds of a supernatural agent. The existence of any 
RIRXUXQLYHUVH·VUHJXODULWLHVLVH[SODLQHGLQWHUPVRI*RG·VGHVLUHWRPDNHDXQLYHUVHLQZKLFK
that regularity obtains. 
)RVWHUDUJXHVWKDWWKHUHDUHWKUHHZD\VZHFDQYLHZ*RG·VFUHDWLYHDFWivity in relation to 
regularities and laws. After rejecting two of these accounts,18 he opts for the third model whereby 
God creates the universe in two stages: (i) by directly creating the universe in its initial state or 
phase and, (ii) by then laying down prescriptions for the systematic ways in which prior states of 
the universe bring about later ones. As Foster explains: 
 
:KDW >*RG@ FUHDWHV GLUHFWO\ LV MXVW >WKH XQLYHUVH·V@ LQLWLDO VWDWH DORQJ ZLWK WKH SUHVFULEHG PRGHV RI
transition for the succession of states through time, and then he leaves all the subsequent history to unfold 
in response³each event or state of affairs that subsequently occurs occurring, as it were, in obedience to 
the original prescription, in the light of the currently prevailing conditions. (2004: 151) 
 
Thus, Foster proposes a model under which God causes the instantiation of regularities 
indirectly: God directly creates the universe in its initial state, and then prescribes the orderly ways 
in which the universe must unfold. Due to the fact that God is seen as creating regularities 
LQGLUHFWO\ , KHUHDIWHU UHIHU WR )RVWHU·V DFFRXQW DV WKH indirect creation of regularities view. Foster 
IXUWKHUH[SODLQVWKDWXQGHUWKLVDFFRXQW*RG·VFDXVLQJRIWKHUHJXODULWLHVLVJLYHQDFUHDWLYHUROe: 
¶7KHUHJXODULWLHVDUHLPSRVHGRQWKHXQLYHUVHDVUHJXODULWLHVOHDYLQJRSHQDOOWKHGHWDLOVRIKRZ
things conform to them, and their imposition is then what, in combination with the conditions 
obtaining at each subsequent time, is responsible for fixing the relevant items of content in a 
FRQIRUPLQJZD\· 
)RVWHU·VLQGLUHFWFUHDWLRQRIUHJXODULWLHVDFFRXQWPLJKWEHFRQWUDVWHGZLWKVRPHWKLQJOLNH
a continuous creation model,19 where God creates the whole universe in a way that ensures the 
direct obtaining of regularities. Foster maintains that God merely prescribes the regularities for the 
universe in its initial stage, and then leaves this prescription to order the subsequent history of 
the universe in a regularity-exemplifying pattern. Foster takes pains to describe this indirect 
creation in terms of God imposing the regularities on the world as regularities. But how does God 
impose the regularities qua regularities? Foster answers that God does so by instituting laws of 
nature. As noted earlier, DFFRUGLQJWR)RVWHUIRUWKHUHWREHDODZLVIRUWKHUHWREH¶VRPHWKLQJ
ZKLFKFDXVHVDQGWKHUHE\FDXVDOO\QHFHVVLWDWHVWKLQJVWREHUHJXODULQ>VRPH@ZD\·
In so creating the laws, God thereby endows material objects with their dispositions (2004: 165). 
How does Foster construe laws? Foster opts for an anti-reductionist approach; taking laws to be 
unidentifiable with any other ontological category. 20  Laws are supposed not to be concrete 
HQWLWLHVEXW ¶DEVWUDFWHQWLWLHVZKRVHH[LVWHQFHFRQVLVWV LQWKHUHOHYDQWIDFWVRIQRPLFQHFHVVLW\·
  8QGHU )RVWHU·V YLHZ ODZV DUH WDNHQ WR EH DEVWUDFW HQWLWLHV UHSUHVHQWLQJ GLYLQH
SUHVFULSWLRQVIRUWKHUHJXODUZD\VLQZKLFKZRUOGO\VWDWHVRIDIIDLUVXQIROG,Q)RVWHU·VZRUGV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7KHWHUP¶ODZ·LVDQoun, signifying a certain kind of entity. But the status of laws as entities is, in a sense, 
RQO\ VXSHUILFLDO« >I@RU WR VSHDN RI WKH H[LVWHQFH RI D FHUWDLQ W\SH RI ODZ LV LQ HIIHFW WR VSHDN RI WKH
obtaining of a certain type of fact³the fact of its being a law that (of its being naturally necessary that) 
things are regular in a certain way. Of course, from a grammatical standpoint, facts themselves are a kind of 
HQWLW\ %XW LW LV QRW DV HQWLWLHV WKDW IDFWV IXQGDPHQWDOO\ IHDWXUH LQ WKH ZRUOG « WKH IXQGDPHQtal way of 
recording the existence or obtaining of a law is not by referring to a law entity, but by stating that it is a law 
that (that it is naturally necessary that) things are regular in such and such a way. (2004: 39) 
 
So, laws are entities in a loose sense; they are objective facts of nomic necessity, but they 
hold contingently. Because he takes the laws to be metaphysically contingent, Foster maintains 
that God must be causally responsible for them; God must create the laws. According to Foster, 
God creates the universe by (i) directly creating the universe in its initial state or phase, and then 
(ii) laying down prescriptions for the systematic ways in which prior states of the universe bring 
about later ones. The view must, therefore, must be a top-down one: it pictures God as imposing 
the regularities via laws, and this in turn means the laws are viewed as existing in a metaphysically 
robust sense. The theory is also anti-singularist because since the regularities and local matters of 
fact are posterior to the laws God prescribes: if c causes e, then that will entail that all C-type 
events cause E-type events.21 
 
 
4. 2EMHFWLRQVWR)RVWHU·V$FFRXQW 
 
The main difficulty with indirect creation of regularities is in seeing what exactly is meant to be 
involved LQ*RG·VFUHDWLQJDODZ:KDWDGGLWLRQDOWKLQJDUHZHWRHQYLVDJH*RGDVGRLQJEHVLGHV
creating the regularities themselves? According to Foster, it is imposing a regularity as a regularity. 
+RZHYHU LW·V KDUG WR VHH ZKDW WKXV FRXOG PHDQ RYHU DQG DERYH VLPply imposing a regularity. 
Without further clarification, this view is at best obscure. 
Foster does tell us that God causes abstract laws of nature to obtain, and that these 
prescribe the way in which nature must unfold. However, since the laws are abstract entities, the 
kind of causation involved must, seemingly, be of a different nature than the kind Foster is 
otherwise seeking to elucidate. Foster cannot give an explanation referring to regularities 
themselves since these are the very things he is seeking to explain. Nor can Foster attempt to 
OLNHQ*RG·VFUHDWLRQRIODZVZLWKKLVFUHDWLRQRIDQ\RWKHUDEVWUDFWD)RUXQOLNHRWKHUDEVWUDFWD
laws are merely contingently necessary. Indeed, we may well question whether the notion of a 
contingent abstract object is a sensible one. Usually, necessary existence is supposed to be a 
defining feature of abstracta. By departing from this notion, we lose part of our already 
somewhat loose grip on what these metaphysically mysterious entities are supposed to be. As 
noted above, for Foster, laws are entities only in a loose VHQVHWKH\·UHIDFWV<HWHYHQVRWKHLGHD
of divine creation of an abstract fact is just as ² if not more ² obscure than the creation of an 
abstract entity. Foster must, it seems, take the divine creation of abstract laws as primitive. 
However, were he to do so, he would fall foul of his principle concerning theoretical elegance ³ 
leaving a sizeable amount of residual puzzlement. 
0RUHRYHU LW·V GLIILFXOW WR VHHKRZ)RVWHU FRXOG H[SODLQKRZD ODZRf nature itself can 
cause. Another defining feature of abstracta is often taken to be their causal inertness. Numbers, 
propositions and sets are supposed to be distinct from the concrete realm since they cannot 
interact with it. How, then can a law cause a FRQFUHWH UHJXODULW\" $JDLQ WKHUH·V PXFK WKDW LV
puzzling here.  
$ IXUWKHU REMHFWLRQ WR )RVWHU LV WKDW LW VHHPV KH KDV RYHUORRNHG WKH IDFW WKDW *RG·V
actions themselves are regular.22 Consider, for example: 
  
(RO) For all states of affairs x, if God wills that x occur, then x will occur 
(RA) For all divine actions y, if God performs y, y will be perfectly good.23  
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How would Foster be able to account for such divine regularities? Presumably he needs to assert 
the existence of a law which governs such regularities of divine activity. However, such a 
proposal would undermine the divine aseity thesis. For, according to the aseity thesis, God is 
HQWLUHO\PHWDSK\VLFDOO\LQGHSHQGHQWDQGWKHSDUDGLJPIUHHDJHQW<HWLI*RG·VDFWLRQVKDGWREH
guided and governed by abstract laws there would certainly be a real conflict with this thesis.24   
)XUWKHUPRUHLI52DQG5$ZHUHDFFRXQWHGIRUE\DEVWUDFWODZVWKHQE\)RVWHU·VRZQ
reasoning, these laws would also need to be caused to exist. However, since God would be 
required to cause them to exist, they themselves would be instances of RO and RA. In which case, 
there would need to be yet further laws to explain these regularities. Hence, a vicious infinite 
regress threatens. Moreover, God would not be able to create such laws antecedently to RO and 
RA; these are essential conditions on all his actions.  In order to block such a regress, a possible 
move for Foster to make would be to maintain that RO and RA are exceptional cases; perhaps 
divine regularities do not require a governing law which explains them. However, aside from 
such a response being ad hocLWZRXOGEHDQXQDWWUDFWLYHPRYHE\)RVWHU·VRZQOLJKWVVLQFHWKH
resulting picture would fall foul of his principle of theoretical elegance, in positing a disjunctive 
account of divine and natural regularities.  
Perhaps the above is uncharitable to Foster, for his contention is that laws require 
explanation because they are merely contingently necessary. In the divine case, however, the associated 
regularities hold of necessity. Therefore, if laws are only needed to explain contingent regularities, 
WKHUHQHHGQ·WEHDODZJRYHUQLQJGLYLQHDFWLRQ5XQQLQJZLWKWKLVFRQWHQWLRQ)RVWHUPLJKWDUJXH
WKDW RQH VKRXOGQ·W H[SHFW RU LQGHHG GHVLUH WKDW WKHUH EH DQ H[SODQDWLRQ RI GLvine regularities 
which exactly matches the one given for natural regularities. He could add that since God is a 
perfect, non-spatiotemporal, omnipotent agent, we ought not to expect divine regularities to 
have the same kind of explanation as that one specified for imperfect, spatio-temporal worldly 
entities. In this case, perhaps Foster could suggest that the explanation for the divine regularities 
resides in *RG·V nature.  
Indeed, Foster should take this response, for God ought not to depend on laws which 
UHJXODWH KLV DFWLRQ UDWKHU *RG·V DFWLRQ VKRXOG EH WKRXJKW RI DV EHLQJ JXLGHG E\ KLV LQWHUQDO
character (i.e. by the divine properties: moral perfection, omniscience, etc.). This is because the 
aseity thesis is best respected when the facts responsible fRU JXLGLQJ *RG·V DFWLRQ DUH WKRVH
which are internal to him. Below we will see why the intuitions underlying this reasoning are 
ones that also ought to be applied when explaining the behaviour of natural objects. In the next 
section, the dispositional essentialist view of laws will be shown not only to be the best way of 
accounting for the above intuitions, but also to be the most theistically acceptable account of 
QDWXUDOODZVUHJXODULWLHVDQG*RG·VUHODWLRQWRWKHP 
 
 
5. Dispositional Essentialism 
 
In this section, we will see that a view Foster dismisses far too quickly is not subject to the same 
GLIILFXOWLHV WKDW)RVWHU·VRZQ DFFRXQW IDFHV7KHYLHZ LQTXHVWLRQ LV GLVSRVLWLRQDO HVVHQWLDOLVP
According to dispositional essentialism, at least some intrinsic properties have dispositional essences; 
the essence of a property P is constituted by the nomic or causal roles P plays. The causal role of 
P LVJLYHQLQWHUPVRILWVSRWHQWLDOFDXVHVDQGHIIHFWVDQGLW·VWKHQDWXUDOFDXVDOSRZHUVRIWKLQJV
which produce the regularities.25$V0XPIRUGH[SODLQV¶3URSHUWLHVDUHWREHUHJDUGHGDVFOXVWHUV
>RI SRZHUV@ ZKRVH LGHQWLWLHV DUH WKHUHE\ IL[HG E\ H[WHQVLRQ·   7KHUH LV D YDULHW\ RI
ways of cashing out dispositional essentialism. Alexander Bird maintains that some properties are 
essentially dispositional and these properties include the properties that figure in the fundamental 
laws of nature (2007: 438). Ellis (2001) holds a similar view but adds to his ontology a metaphysic 
of natural kinds, which, he argues, have essential properties (e.g. electrons are essentially 
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negatively charged). Some dispositional essentialists take the stronger position, that all sparse26 
properties are essentially dispositional. This stronger thesis implies the transworld identity 
condition that: properties P and Q are identical iff they play the same theoretical roles. The 
theoretical roles played by a property determine how its bearer is disposed to act in various 
circumstances.  
)RVWHU·VREMHFWLRQWRGLVSRVLWLRQDOHVVHQWLDOLVPLVWhat even if we can make sense of the 
notion of an autonomous disposition³i.e. a disposition that does not rely on an underlying law 
of nature³the existence of individual autonomous dispositions cannot explain collective 
UHJXODULWLHVZHVWLOOKDYH¶QRH[SOanation of why different objects of the same intrinsic type have 
WKHVDPHGLVSRVLWLRQV·)RVWHUUHMHFWVWKLVDOWHUQDWLYHEHFDXVHKHLVXQDEOHWRVHHZKDW
could sustain a necessary association between intrinsic properties and powers or dispositions. 
However, dispositional essentialism maintains that (at least some of) the intrinsic properties of 
objects are essentially dispositional in character, so some of the intrinsic properties are the 
dispositions, meaning that the relation between the two types of property (at least in some cases) 
would be one of identity.27 
As noted in §2, it is something of a philosophical orthodoxy to endorse a distinction 
between categorical and dispositional properties. Given this distinction, and given that 
dispositional essentialists are realists with respect to dispositions, there are three main positions 
they could take with respect to the ontology of properties. Mixed views accept the existence of both 
types of properties (commonly, these take the dispositions to be rooted in categorical bases). 
Dispositional monism, as the name suggests, denies the existence of categorical properties, and 
maintains that all properties are dispositions. A third view ² counter to orthodoxy ² rejects any 
ontological distinction between categorical and dispositional properties. Mumford (1998), for 
example, maintains a ¶QHXWUDO PRQLVP·, which asserts that all properties are of the same 
fundamental type, but may be viewed both as dispositional and categorical. It ought to be noted 
that the VHFRQGDQGWKLUGRIWKHVHYLHZVSURYLGHIXUWKHUUHSOLHVWR)RVWHU·VREMHFWLRQWKDWQRWKLQJ
could explain the association of dispositions and intrinsic properties. Dispositional monism will 
HQWDLO WKDW DQ DOO RI REMHFW·V SURSHUWLHV LQFOXGLQJ LWV LQWULQVLF ones, are dispositional; neutral 
monism will entail that the intrinsic categorical properties of objects are identical with their 
dispositional ones. However, given that Mumford (1998) has argued convincingly at length that, 
inter alia, the neutral monist has an ontologically and explanatorily more parsimonious theory 
than their rival, it seems that this is the strongest form of dispositional essentialism to advance.   
Given that dispositional essentialism is (pace Foster) available to theists, it would be worth 
IOHVKLQJRXWWKHGHWDLOVUHTXLUHGLQRUGHUWRPDNHVHQVHRI*RG·VUHODWLRQWRQDWXUDO ODZV+RZ
ought a theistic dispositional essentialism characterise the notion of dispositionality? Consider the 
example case of the disposition of water to boil and evaporate when heated to 100o&:KDW·V
LQYROYHGDSSHDUV WREHD UHODWLRQEHWZHHQ WKH OLTXLG·VEHLQJFRPSRVHGRI+2O molecules that 
have a particular structure, being heated to 100oC, and gaseousness; between the 
dispositional/categorical property, stimulus, and manifestation, respectively. According to the 
dispositional essentialist, properties have their causal profiles essentially; since any property that 
is essential to X is necessary to X, the relations between these properties will hold necessarily.  
These relations will also be internal (where, following Lewis (1986: 62), an internal relation is one 
that supervenes on the intrinsic natures of its relata taken separately (and external otherwise). For, 
if the relations between dispositional/categorical property, manifestation, and stimulus were 
external, then God would be required to establish them, in addition to creating the properties in 
question. But, if this were the case, then the ontological priority of dispositions over laws of 
nature would be undermined, since it is precisely those connections (i.e. relations) which laws of 
nature express. For this reason, a theistic dispositional essentialism ought to maintain that such 
relations are internal.  
What should the theist characterise these properties as? Broadly speaking, there are two 
main options: (i) the Platonic ante rem view, and (ii) the Aristotelian in re conception. The former 
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view takes properties to be Platonic universals, abstract entities which exist independently of 
their instances. The latter view, by contrast, takes properties to exist only in their instances either 
as concrete universals (ones that are multiply-instantiable) or as particularised tropes (which are 
not multiply instantiable, but form a resemblance class with properties of the same type).  
1RZ LQRUGHUIRUWKHLVWLFGLVSRVLWLRQDOHVVHQWLDOLVPWRIDUHEHWWHU WKDQ)RVWHU·VYLHZ LW
will need to take an Aristotelian conception of properties. For, one of the criticisms levelled 
DJDLQVW)RVWHU·VYLHZZDVWKDWLWUHOLHGRQWKHFRQFHSWLRQRI*RG·VFUHDWLQJabstract laws of nature; 
a notion which was obscure at best, incoherent at worst. If the dispositional essentialist account 
on offer here were to identify properties with Platonic universals then it would face the same 
objection. Therefore, theists ought to countenance either concrete universals or tropes as the 
metaphysical kind with which to associate dispositional properties. In this case, they may 
maintain that in creating states of affairs and particulars, God also creates dispositional 
properties. It is in creating these dispositional properties that God creates laws of nature.  
There are a number of theoretical benefits which follow from adopting a dispositional 
HVVHQWLDOLVWDFFRXQWRI*RG·VUHODWLRQWRODZVLHWKHLVWLFdispositional essentialism) as opposed 
to a top-GRZQ DFFRXQW VXFK DV )RVWHU·V LQGLUHFW FUHDWLRQ RI UHJXODULWLHV $V QRWHG WKHLVWLF
GLVSRVLWLRQDO HVVHQWLDOLVP SUHVHQWV D ¶ERWWRP-XS· DSSURDFK WR ODZV DV RSSRVHG WR LQGLUHFW
creation of regularities which vieZVODZVDVJRYHUQLQJREMHFWVDQGHYHQWVLQD¶WRS-GRZQ·IDVKLRQ
A bottom-up approach to laws fits better with the sovereignty and aseity theses. If the laws were 
to supervene on the essential dispositional properties of objects, they would not be external 
entities imposing restrictions on the objects they govern. RO and RA, for example, can be 
accounted for by omnipotence and omnibenevolence qua dispositional properties.  
We can see then, that theistic dispositional essentialism allows for a unified account of 
divine and non-GLYLQHFDXVDWLRQZKHUHDV)RVWHU·VDFFRXQWFDQQRW7KHGLOHPPDIDFLQJ)RVWHU·V
indirect creation of regularities account arose because of the fact that Foster was unable to 
account for divine regularities in the same way as natural regularities. However, under theistic 
dispositional essentialism, both God and non-divine entities have intrinsic properties which are 
HVVHQWLDOO\GLVSRVLWLRQDO LQQDWXUH7KHVHSURSHUWLHVH[SODLQWKHUHJXODULWLHVLQ*RG·VDFWLRQ MXVW
as they explain the regular behaviour of non-divine objects.  
I pointed out in §4 that Foster may respond to the objection regarding accounting for 
GLYLQH UHJXODULWLHV ZLWK WKH FODLP WKDW ZH VKRXOG H[SHFW DQ H[SODQDWLRQ WR FRPH IURP *RG·V
nature rather than laws of nature. This seems right. Presumably, if we are explaining the 
regularity of action of a divine omnipotent agent, then if there is an explanation available which 
refers only to facts which are wholly dependent on³and internal to³an  agent, then this 
explanation ought to be preferred over one which refers to facts that are either entirely or partly 
independent of that agent. This is due to the aseity thesis: if God is wholly independent, then the 
regularity of his actions ought not to depend on facts external to him. However, theistic 
dispositional essentialism offers an explanation of this type since the explanation of RO and RA 
can be given by pointing to the respective divine properties omnipotence and moral perfection. These 
properties (however they are defined) would seem, at least, to imply the following dispositions, 
respectively: 
 
D1: being such that whatever state of affairs, S, you will, S is actualised. 
D2: being such that whatever state of affairs, S, you will, S is for the good.  
 
Now, it may well be that there is more to being omnipotent than possessing D1, and that 
WKHUH·V PRUH WR EHLQJ PRUDOO\ SHUIHFW WKDQ SRVVHVVLQJ ' +RZHYHU LW VHHPV XQFRQWURYHUVLDO
that any omnipotent being (qua omnipotent being) must possess D1, and any morally perfect 
being (qua morally perfect being) must possess D2. In other words, D1 and D2 are, respectively, 
necessary condition on omnipotence and moral perfection. 
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So, it looks like the best way to respond to the need to account for divine regularities is 
by adopting a dispositional essentialism with respect to the divine nature. That is, we should take 
it that the attributes constitutive of the divine essence are dispositional in nature. Take, for 
example, divine regularity D1: being such that whatever state of affairs, S, you will, S is actualised. 
This regularity will be accounted for by the divine property, omnipotence, taken as a 
dispositional property, together with the divine will. The regularity D1 will be accounted for by 
the internal relation which holds between omnipotence, *RG·VZLOODQGDFWXDOLVDWLRQ7KHUHIRUH
since omnipotence is part of the divine nature, theistic dispositional essentialism, unlike the 
indirect creation of regularities view, will not suffer the problematic consequence that there is a 
law external to God to which God is subject. Theists have, then, further reason to maintain 
dispositional essentialism. Theistic dispositional essentialism provides an explanation of divine 
regularities which fully respects both the aseity thesis and the thesis of divine libertarian freedom. 
Now, perhaps the theist would be justified in presenting a non-unified account if there 
were relevant differences between divine and non-divine causality which made it such that a 
unified account was problematic. However, if a unified account is available, and if there are no 
reasons for the theist to prefer a disjunctive account, then, on the basis of theoretical elegance, a 
unified account should be favoured.  
There are at least two respects in which theistic dispositional essentialism presents a 
simpler theory than indirect creation of regularities. Firstly, under theistic dispositional 
essentialism, since laws supervene on the essential dispositional properties of objects, God need 
do nothing more than create those objects (and properties) to create the regularities and laws of 
QDWXUH 8QGHU )RVWHU·V DFFRXQW ZKHQ *RG FUHDWHV WKH DFWXDO ZRUOG DQG WKH REMHFWV ZLWKLQ LW
there is a further thing he is required to do ² he has to create the laws in addition to these objects. 
Secondly, substance causation is prima facie more intelligible than causation of laws. For, as much 
as causation is observable, it is the causation of one object or agent by another, (or at least, 
events involving them) which we have experience of observing. Yet, we have no such 
observation of the creation of non-substances; it is unclear how one can even make sense of the 
creation of abstracta. At the very least, Foster owes us some kind of indication of what might be 
involved here.   
 
 
6. Objections to Theistic Dispositional Essentialism 
 
Objection 1: Under this view, properties have dispositions, powers, or potencies essentially, since it 
LVSDUWRIDSURSHUW\·VYHU\QDWXUHWKDWLWEHKDYHVLQWKHZD\WKDWLWGRHV,WLVWKHUHIRUHnecessary 
that properties behave in the ways they do. However, if regularities are metaphysically necessary, 
then one might think this undermines the need for God. The worry is that there is no creative 
role left for God in respect to the instantiation of regularities.  
Reply: This is misguided. Under theistic dispositional essentialism, properties have their 
dispositions and powers essentially and so the laws these properties ground will (contra Foster) be 
QHFHVVDU\,WIROORZV WKHQ WKDW LW·VRXWVLGHWKHVFRSHRI*RG·VSRZHUWRGHFLGHZKLFK ODZVRf 
nature will govern the behaviour of the properties and objects which exist in @. However, it 
QRQHWKHOHVV UHPDLQV ZLWKLQ *RG·V SRZHU WR GHFLGH which properties to create. In having causal 
responsibility for which properties are instantiated in @, God thereby decides how things will 
behave. According to dispositional essentialism, the laws are metaphysically necessary (but 
logically contingent) in every world in which the relevant properties exist. 
Objection 2: Since God has his dispositions essentially, and since his dispositions ground 
laws, divine aseity undermined here too. For, God will have no control over, and therefore no 
responsibility for, his nature and the laws which regulate his actions.  
Reply: $WWKHYHU\OHDVWLW·VQRWREYLRXVWKDWLWLV8QGHU)RVWHU·VSUHIHUUHGDFFRXQW*RG
is, as argued, constrained by laws which are independent of him, for the laws are construed as 
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governing in a top-down manner; this definitely threatens divine aseity. However, under theistic 
dispositional essentialism, ZKLOVW*RG·VGLVSRVLWLRQDOQDWXUHZLOOEHHVVHQWLDO WRKLP qua divine 
being, this merely constitutes a restriction in terms of facts dependent upon, and internal to, himself 
only; dispositional essentialism is a bottom-XS YLHZ RI JRYHUQDQFH ,W·V QRW FOHDr that being 
FRQVWUDLQHG E\ RQH·V RZQ QDWXUH LV WKH NLQG RI WKLQJ WKDW WKH DVHLW\ WKHVLV VKRXOG SUHFOXGH
&RQVLGHUIRUH[DPSOHWKDWDJRRGQXPEHURIWKHLVWVDOUHDG\DFFHSWWKDW*RG·VQDWXUHSUHFOXGHV
him from sinning, but this is not thought to impugn aseity.  
  Objection 3: Classical theism maintains the doctrine of pure actuality (actus purus); the idea 
WKDWWKHUHLVQRSRWHQWLDOLW\LQ*RG·VQDWXUH)RUH[DPSOHWKLVFDQEHIRXQGLQ7KRPDV$TXLQDV
(1975: Chapter 1728)). Yet, pure actuality seems in direFWWHQVLRQZLWKWKHVXJJHVWLRQWKDW*RG·V
nature be essentially dispositional.  
Reply: 7R EHJLQ ZLWK LW·V UHDOO\ QRW FOHDU WR ZKDW H[WHQW WKH QRWLRQ RI SXUH DFWXDOLW\ HYHQ
makes sense or what further role it has to play in perfect being theology. However, if one does 
go in for this view, we can allay any worries that it is undermined by theistic dispositional 
essentialism. Firstly, recall that the view being advocated takes dispositional properties to be 
identical to categorical ones. Secondly, it can be mDLQWDLQHGWKDW*RG·VGLVSRVLWLRQVDUH eternally 
manifested: there is never any time at which these dispositions are only potentially manifested. 
Secondly, if one finds the notion of a disposition that is never unmanifested problematic, we can 
still point out that the potentiality lies in the manifestations RI *RG·V DQG RWKHU WKLQJ·V
dispositions, not in the dispositional property itself: God actually possesses his dispositional 
properties even when those properties are only potentially, not actually, manifested. Consider: 
salt remains water-VROXEOHHYHQZKHQLW·VQRWDFWXDOO\GLVVROYLQJLQZDWHU 
 
 
7. The Universals Account 
 
Aside from these objections, one may point out that there is an alternative view of laws available 
which is yet to be considered: the universals account. If the universals account is as plausible as 
WKHLVWLFGLVSRVLWLRQDOHVVHQWLDOLVPWKHQWKHLVWVKDYHWZRDYDLODEOHDOWHUQDWLYHVWR)RVWHU·VDFFRXQW
However, the universals account is not compatible with traditional theism.  
As explained above, the universals account takes laws to be a relation between second-
order universals. According to Armstrong, this relation is a relation of nomic necessitation, N. So, 
to recap, if it is a law that: ׊x [Fx Ⱥ*x], then this will be explained by the holding of the relation 
N between the two universals F and G: N [F, G]. In §2.3, it was noted that, according to the 
universals account, causal relations are supervenient on the nomic necessity relations: the laws 
strongly govern the objects and events which are subsumed by them. Armstrong explains this in 
greater detail when he states:  
 
Transfer in thought the concept of necessitation from the sphere of particular states of affairs, taken simply 
as particular, to the sphere of sorts or types of states of affairs, that is, universals. Instead of a's being F 
necessitating it to be the case that a is G, without benefit of law, we have instead something's being F 
necessitating that something to be G, where a type of state of affairs (the universal F) necessitates a type of 
state of affairs (the universal G). It is then clear that if such a relation holds between the universals, then it 
is automatic that each particular F determines that it is a G. That is just the instantiation of the universal 
N(F, G) in particular cases. The left-hand side of our formula represents the law, a state of affairs which is 
simultaneously a relation. The right-hand side of the formula represents the uniformity automatically 
resulting from the instantiation of this universal in its particulars. (1985: 97) 
 
What this means is that in order for God to be involved in any causal nexus in which he 
LV WKH FDXVH DQG DQ HYHQW LV WKH HIIHFW LH *RG·V DELOLW\ WR FDXVH ZLOO EH GHSHQGHQW RQ RU
metaphysically posterior to, the holding of a nomic necessitation relation between universals 
instantiated by himself and those instantiated by whatever objects or events he is bringing about. 
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The problem here is that the types of action God can perform and the kinds of effects he can 
bring about will be dependent on the laws, rather than any facts internal to himself; a result 
which is in tension with at the thesis of divine aseity.   
A proponent of the universals approach might reply that whilst there is indeed a 
dependency here, it is not a problematic one. For, since the universals are merely contingently 
related, God must be responsible for setting the relations between universals in the way that they 
are arranged. In this case, the universals (and ipso facto the nomic necessitation relations) depend 
on God; not vice versa.  
,QUHVSRQVHWRWKLVLWRXJKWWREHSRLQWHGRXWWKDW*RG·VVHWWLQJWKHUHODWLRQVLQWKDWZD\
LWVHOI PXVW FRQVWLWXWH VRPH NLQG RI FDXVDO DFWLYLW\ )RU LI *RG·V JURXSLQJ RI XQLYHUVDOV LV DQ
activity, and (successful) acts are understood in causal terms, then this will be an instance of 
causing. However, if such an act is to be causal, there would need to be nomic necessitation 
relations in place already. As explained above, this is because the account is anti-singularist. 
Dispositional essentialism has the benefit that it attributes causal explanations to the 
dispositions of the objects involved. Contrastively, under the universals approach, the 
explanation is being tied to the laws. The nomic necessitation relations are responsible for the 
pushing and pulling. Under the dispositional essentialist account, the laws are derivative of the 
SURSHUWLHVRIREMHFWVVRWKHFDXVDO ¶RRPSK·OLHVZLWKWKHREMHFWV6R LQVXPWKHLVPILWVEHWWHU
with a bottom-up, as opposed to a top-down view of laws.    
 
 
8. The Regularities/Systems Account 
 
$VZH·YHVHHQXQGHUUHJXODULW\ WKHRU\ ODZVDUHVXSHUYHQLHQWRQWKHQRQ-causal properties and 
relations of particulars. The regularity theory is therefore a bottom-up view. Does this mean it 
offers theists an alternative to theistic dispositional essentialism? Unfortunately not. For, views 
of this type also maintain a thesis which Michael Tooley (1984: 93) terms the Humean 
Supervenience of Causal Relations: 
 
(HSCR): The truth values of singular causal statements are logically determined by the 
truth values of statements of causal laws together with the truth values of 
noncausal statements about particulars.  
 
The regularity theory maintains that the truth values of causal statements are logically 
determined by the truth values of statements regarding causal laws and particulars. It also 
maintains that causal relations are ontologically supervenient on causal laws and particulars. What 
this means is that causal laws are ontologically prior to (or more basic than) causal relations.  
HSCR is to be contrasted with singularism regarding causal relations, which, recall, 
PDLQWDLQVWKDWLWLVWKH¶FDXVDOUHODWLRQVEHWZHHQVWDWHVRIDIIDLUVWKDWDUHSULPDU\DQGWKDW causal 
laws are secondary·29 (Tooley, 1984: 96) singularism thus views the ontological and explanatory 
priority of causal relations and causal laws in the opposite direction to the regularity theory.  
Since the regularity theory maintains HSCR, it apparently does not leave any room for 
singular causation. Aside from any philosophical worries one might have with this view, it seems 
particularly problematic for the theist. Why is this? To begin with, perhaps the most important 
causal commitment the theist has is: 
 
Creation:   The universe was created ex nihilo, by an eternal, maximally perfect God. 
 
The doctrine of Creation is taken to present a unique causal act. Since classical theism takes 
Creation to have occurred ex nihilo, there were no causal events prior to it, and there are no and 
never will be any causal events comparable to it. Creation is the first causal event ² the event 
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from which causally precedes all others. However, if this doctrine is to be maintained, then it 
looks to provide a strong case for singularism regarding causal relations. For, if the doctrine of 
Creation is to have meaning, it must do so individually and in its own right; its meaning must not 
be³indeed, by definition, it cannot be³determined by true statements of causal laws and 
particulars, because the causal laws themselves depend on the regularities in nature. Yet, Creation 
is ontologically prior to such regularities. Theists cannot, then, hold any version of the regularity 
view, since Creation implies singularism.  
A second, related, reason why classical theism is inconsistent with the truth of the 
regularity theory comes from the UHJXODULW\WKHRU\·V tension with the aseity thesis. As was argued 
in §4FRQWUD)RVWHU·VSRVLWLRQLI*RGLVSHUIHFWO\IUHHWKHQKHRXJKWQRWWREHGHSHQGHQWRQWKH
holding of laws in order to act. However, if the regularity theory is true, then so is HSCR. But if 
HSCR is true, then God may only cause if (i) there is a class of resembling cases of acts, and (ii) 
if there is a covering law. Since (i) and (ii) are inconsistent with divine aseity, the regularity theory 
does not do justice to the commitments of classical theism.  
 
 
9. Conclusion 
 
Foster has argued that the only feasible theistic account of laws is one that takes a realist view of 
laws; one where God causes those laws to obtain and thereby imposes regularities as regularities. 
)RVWHU·VYLHZhas been shown to be deeply problematic. However, we have seen that there are a 
number of ways in which a dispositional essentialist account fits more naturally with the 
commitments of classical theism and avoids the problems DVVRFLDWHGZLWK)RVWHU·VYLHZ$WWKH 
very least, then, dispositional essentialism is further deserving of WKHWKHLVW·Vattention.30 
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1 The former is an informal statement of an instance of the second law of thermodynamics, while the latter is an 
LQIRUPDOVWDWHPHQWRI%R\OH·VODZ 
2 $V,·OO JRRQ WRH[SODLQ LQJUHDter detail in §2, those who have a conception of laws which identifies laws with 
regularities themselves (the regularity theory) typically deny this claim; regularity theorists typically take the existence 
of regularities to be brute. 
3 I take natural regularities to be those which occur naturally, in the sense of not being man-made. 
4 Along with the claim that regularities require explanation, the idea that laws of nature have a governing role is a 
contentious one. As will be explained in §2 the conception of laws which identifies laws with regularities denies that 
laws have any governing role. Helen Beebee (2000) argues explicitly that the thesis that laws govern is not a 
conceptual truth. 
5 There is an issue here concerning exactly how well laws provide an explanation for the existence of regularities. 
That is, one might wonder why the laws are as they are; why do laws exist? Justification is needed for the claim that 
laws are a better stopping point for explanation than regularities themselves. This is an interesting and important 
LVVXH+RZHYHULW·VRXWVLGHWKHVFRSHRIWKLVSDSHUWRFRQVLGHU,·OOVXSSRVHIRUWKHVDNHRIGLVFXVVLRQWKDWWKHUH·VD
satisfactory answer to this question.     
6 $VIDUDV,·PDZDUH WKHUHDUHRQO\ WZRWKHLVWLFDFFRXQWVRIQDWural laws on offer in the contemporary analytical 
SKLORVRSKLFDOOLWHUDWXUH2QHRIWKHVHLV)RVWHU·VWKHRWKHULVDGYDQFHGE\(YDQ)DOHV,WVKRXOGEHQRWHGWKDW
)DOHV·YLHZDQGWKHRQH,SUHVHQWLQWKLVSDSHUDUHVLPLODUVLQFHWKH\HDFKHQGRUVHD dispositional essentialist view of 
laws. However, there are also some important differences. For example, Fales takes his position to entail Platonism; 
mine (which I term theistic dispositional essentialism) does not. As will be argued in §5, the theist, due to their 
commitment to divine aseity and sovereignty, is required to accept an Aristotelian ² rather than Platonist ² account 
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RI SURSHUWLHV %HFDXVH RI WKLV )DOHV· DFFRXQW LV UXOHG RXW E\ P\ DUJXPHQWV ,Q DQ\ FDVH WKH FRQVLGHUDWLRQV DQG
arguments I provide for a theistic dispositional essentialism differ from those presented by Fales. Given this, 
)RVWHU·VDFFRXQWSURYLGHVDJRRGVWDUWLQJSRLQWIURPZKLFKWREXLOGDQHZSURSRVDO 
7 H[SODLQVLQGHWDLOZKDWLVPHDQWE\¶WRS-GRZQ·DQG¶ERWWRP-XS·DFFounts of laws; §2.3 explains what is meant 
by singularist vs. anti-singularist accounts.  
8 I take non-QRPLF HQWLWLHV WR EH WKRVH ZKLFK GR QRW DIIRUG DQ\ FDXVDO ¶RRPSK· VXFK DV FDWHJRULFDO SURSHUWLHV
regularities, and abstracta. The class of nomic entities will include dispositions, laws, and capacities etc.   
9 For Armstrong, universals are immanent, repeatable entities which can only exist if they are instantiated by some 
object(s). 
10 The dispositional essentialist account of laws will be presented in greater detail in §5. 
11 7KRXJKGHSHQGLQJRQZKDWRQH·VYLHZRIlaws is, it may be better to speak of entailment rather than production.  
12 There is an issue concerning whether laws ought to be considered as entities, or statements which express facts. If 
laws DUHHQWLWLHVWKHQWKH\·OOKDYHPRGDOSURSHUWLHVLIVWDWHPHQWVWKHQWKH\·OOKDYHPRGDOVWDWXV)RUHDVH,ZLOOVSHDN
in terms of laws having modal properties.  
13
 I consider this assumption to be relatively uncontroversial. See, e.g. Kripke (1980) and Fine (1994). 
14 Emphasis added. 
15 Emphasis added. 
16 See David Hume (1888/1978: 20). 
17 Or perhaps more accurately: the property confers different causal powers onto its bearer. 
18 In brief the other two accounts are versions of the regularity view: (i) a model under which God causes the 
regularities to obtain in @ directly; and (ii) a model whereby God causes the regularities to obtain in @ directly, in 
VWDJHV,W·VRXWVLGHWKHVFRSHRIWKLVSDSHUKRZHYHUWRDVVHVV)RVWHU·VUHDVRQVIRUUHMHFWLQJWKHVH 
19 Continuous creation is the theory that God is responsible for the persistence of objects by continuously creating 
them ² rather than merely conserving them ² at each instant of their existence. 
20 He does so due to philosophical objections to the alternative aSSURDFKHV+RZHYHULW·VEH\RQGWKHVFRSHRIWKLV
paper to examine these reasons. 
21 Foster considers indirect creation of regularities to be the only PRGHOZKLFKFDQLDGHTXDWHO\DFFRXQWIRU*RG·V
imposing the regularities on the world as regularities, and (ii) successfully account for the assumptions outlined in §3. 
22 This point is also made by Evan Fales (2004). 
23 RO and RA (my abbreviations) stand for the regularity of omnipotence and the regularity of action, respectively.  
24 There are a number of philosophers, such as William Lane Craig (2014), who argue that the existence of abstracta 
would undermine AT. - 
25 The dispositional essentialist may be either eliminativist or reductionist about laws. Mumford (2004: Chapter 10), 
for example, maintains that once we identify properties as having certain essential causal powers, laws can no longer 
have a governing role ² a role he takes to be a necessary characteristic of laws ² and so we therefore should 
eliminate them from our ontology. Alternatively, one might deny, along with Bird (2007: Chapter 9) that laws 
require no such governing role and that laws supervene on dispositions. However, this debate need not concern us 
here. For, either position is consistent with the view I advance below.  
26  Following David Lewis (1986: 59-60), sparse properties are intrinsic, highly specific and perfectly natural 
SURSHUWLHVWKH\DUHWKRVHZKLFK¶FDUYHQDWXUHDWWKHMRLQWV· 
27 Also pointed out by Evan Fales (2004). 
28 He states (op. cit ¶*RGDQGSULPHPDWWHUDUHGLVWLQJXLVKed: one is pure act, the other is pure potency, and they 
DJUHHLQQRWKLQJ· 
29 Emphasis added.  
30  Thanks to audiences at the Religious Studies @ 50 conference, the 7th Birmingham Philosophy of Religion 
Workshop, Leeds Centre for Philosophy of Religion, and Leeds Postgraduate Seminar. Special thanks to Sarah 
Adams, Richard Caves, Robin Le Poidevin, Matthew Dean, Jon Robson, Helen Steward, and Carl Warom. I am also 
grateful to the Royal Institute of Philosophy whose Jacobsen award helped to fund this research. 
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